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will later be explained in further detail on page four. For
now, it is important to simply understand that having an
infinitely passionate interest in something means that the

Many philosophers have dedicated a significant amount of
their time to proving the existence of God through both a
priori and a posteriori arguments. However, Robert Adams
suggests that Søren Kierkegaard views the efforts of these
philosophers to have been in vain, because faith and
objective reasoning are not compatible. To see why he
asserts this, we will first look at Kierkegaard's conception of
both faith and objective reasoning. Then, using these to
understand his arguments for why a separation between
these must occur, we will then examine the potentially dire
implications this may have for society and why, at the same
time, this is beneficial to religion.
Before we can examine the aforementioned
implications of the separating of religious faith from
objective reasoning, we must establish why the two are
inherently incompatible. It helps to first identify what
Kierkegaard 's idea of religious faith actually entails and
what he means by “objective reasoning”. For him, “faith
must be decisive”—the establishment of it should be a
resolution, which by definition implies that one does away
with any doubts that may have been previously held
(Adams 2). And this exclusion of doubt needs to be a
conscious, fully informed decision made by the holder of
faith—i.e. this believer has to be aware of this chance of
error that he or she has chosen to disregard. In addition,
he thinks that “in all genuine religious faith the believer is
infinitely interested in the object of his faith” and that “the
most essential and most valuable feature of religiousness
is passion” (Adams 2, 7). From these two premises, the
conception of an “infinitely passionate interest” can be
formed and according to Kierkegaard, must be the kind of
interest one has in religious faith. The nature of this infinite
passion can be better understood once we have

importance we deem it to have has no limit. Our other
concern thus far is the sense in which “objective reasoning”
is used. According to Adams, objective reasoning is
reasoning with a conclusion that is deemed to be “true or
probably true” by “every (or almost every) intelligent, fairminded, and sufficiently informed person” (Adams 1). This
simply means that it has to be sufficiently supported by
evidence to the point where it can be clearly and widely
accepted as a truth. With the aforementioned background
information in mind, we can now look at the arguments that
Adams sees Kierkegaard providing for why one cannot
reason objectively to confirm religious faith.
For the first argument, which Adams refers to as
Kierkegaard's “Approximation Argument”, it should be
noted that Kierkegaard works under the assumption that “a
system of religious beliefs might be objectively probable”
(Adams 7). This, of course, is not what he truly believes
and is used here “only for the sake of argument” (Adams
7). The argument begins with the notion that all historical
facts contain some chance of error and therefore, “the
greatest attainable certainty with respect to anything
historical is merely an approximation” (as cited in Adams 12). This can be better illustrated with Adams' Civil War
example. There is, according to Kierkegaard's argument, a
very small probability that we are wrong in asserting that
the American Civil War occurred. However, we can still say
that we do indeed “know” that the Civil War occurred
because this possibility of error is so small that deeming it
to be a serious concern would be unnecessary. This is the
Civil War though, for which, unlike religious faith, we do not
have an infinitely passionate interest. When it comes to
something we are infinitely passionate about, any
possibility of error is significant because there is no limit to

established that faith and reason are incompatible and thus
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how important the matter is to us. If we are now to recall

being revised in the future (Adams 6). This then seems to

Kierkegaard's conception of faith, we notice that there is a

point us towards a search for objective reasoning that does

contradiction here—because of our infinite interest in the

not contain such a chance, but as we concluded before, all

object of faith, any possible error is significant to us, but

empirical objective reasoning contains the possibility of

faith is a decisive act, which requires us to extinguish these

needing to be revised in the future. Therefore, we arrive at

errors. Therefore, in having faith, one is disregarding these

the conclusion that “authentic religious faith cannot without

possible errors, taking “a 'leap' beyond the evidence” and

error be based on any objective empirical reasoning”

this leap “cannot be justified by objective reasoning”

(Adams 6). Here, just like in the previous argument,

(Adams 3).

Kierkegaard illustrates that faith cannot be based on

In continuing with the issues that lie in objective

reason due to the nature of objective reasoning and its

historical reasoning that were the basis for the

constant editing and uncertainty and the practice of

Approximation Argument, we can understand what Adams

authentic faith needing to be a commitment.

calls the Postponement Argument. In relation to the idea

With these last two arguments, Kierkegaard was

that all historical “facts” carry some doubt, Kierkegaard

working through them on the assumption that religious faith

says that we are always still tweaking the “answers” that

can be based in objective reasoning in order to illustrate all

we have thus far for historical inquiries and therefore to try

of the technical problems with this idea. However, in this

to support or confirm one's own faith with historical facts

argument, which Adams calls the “Passion Argument”,

would be an endless waiting game. There is always the

Kierkegaard argues objective reasoning is not only useless

possibility of something that we deem to be true now,

to religion, “but inimical to religion's true interests” (Adams

changing some time in the future, causing someone to

7). As it was mentioned earlier, Kierkegaard views faith as

suspend his or her faith forever. This suspension would

“the highest passion in a man”, therefore implying that

occur because faith for Kierkegaard must be a decisive

nothing other than this passion is attainable. When we see

commitment—a genuine believer cannot be one who will

how one may attempt to utilize objective reasoning to

abandon their faith under any circumstances. Therefore the

support his or her faith, it seems to be suggesting that

option of one declaring their belief only to later change it

something more than this mere infinite passion, i.e.

when new evidence surfaces is off the table because this

“probabilities and guarantees”, can be attained (Adams 7).

person would not be a genuine believer—they are not

But for Kierkegaard, religious belief “ought to be based on

“totally committed to the belief” (Adams 6). So from this we

a strenuous exertion of the will—a passionate striving”,

can say that one with genuine faith would not abandon said

therefore making objective reasoning undesirable to

faith under any circumstances. But if the evidence that one

religion primarily due to religion's necessity for infinite

is objectively basing their belief on ends up being edited in

passion (Adams 7). From this, Adams says Kierkegaard

the future, they would still have to hold to their belief, which

would conclude that objective improbability must be

now is not based solely on the objective reasoning, for this

present in an infinite passion. Because passion is the most

reasoning has now been revised. According to Adams, this

important component to religious belief, religious belief

situation tells us that authentic beliefs cannot “depend

therefore necessitates objective improbability. Adams

entirely” on any objective reasoning that has the chance of

postulates that for Kierkegaard's argument, this objective
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improbability that is demanded is that of at least one belief

Going through Kierkegaard's arguments allows us

that would have to follow or must be true upon the

to see why he believes that objective reasoning and

attainment of religious passion (Adams 8).

religion, in principle, must exist in separate spheres, but

We said that an infinite passion requires objective

what are the implications of this separation? If religion

improbability and we can examine some more reasons for

cannot be based on objective reasoning, it seems that it

why Kierkegaard asserts this. For one, if something is

would be based on a passion that is subjective. With

objectively improbable, there is great risk in believing it to

subjectivity, we of course lose any uniformity and without

be true because, objectively, it is most likely not true.

any objective or uniform conceptions in religion, we cannot

Passion, in most senses, is an intense feeling or emotion

say that anyone's faith in something is incorrect so long as

for something, but since we are talking about an infinite

they feel a genuine, infinite passion for this faith. This starts

passion, we need some sort of system to measure the

to become worrisome when we consider the immense

intensity of a passion in order to comprehend what an

number of individual minds, which include all kinds of

infinite one might be. Using the definition of passion, we

variation in thought processes, level of sanity, and any

would look at determining how intense a strong emotion for

other factor that is seen in variation throughout mankind.

something is and the best way to do this is to examine the

With a large number of different thinkers and a doctrine

actions it would produce. Kierkegaard suggests that

that claims religious faith is achieved through genuine

looking at the amount of risk one takes in achieving

passion, we have a pretty large probability of this

something demonstrates the level of passion one has for

manifesting itself in some dangerous ways. Numerous

that something. He would say that someone who risks

leaders of cults throughout the past have appeared to be

more than someone else to achieve the same thing would

genuinely convinced that they have received a message

therefore have more passion for that thing. Having

from God, which many times has been a message that

established that risk and passion are directly proportional,

does harm to other people. If we accept Kierkegaard's

we can conclude that the highest possible passion, which

definition of faith and its separation from reason, can we

is needed for authentic religious faith, would be

not protest these harmful views a person might have? It

demonstrated by risking as much as possible. To risk as

seems that this would have to be the case. This separation

much as possible, there needs to be “the smallest possible

of reason and faith appears to be beneficial to religion, for

chance of success” when one is trying to attain something,

it allows one to cater to what one passionately feels, even

and the attaining of this end must involve “the greatest

if it is slightly different from the ideas of established

possible sacrifices” (Adams 9). And since this passion is

religion. It can result in a more authentic and personalized

described as being “infinite”, “there is no sacrifice so great

form of faith. However, we must not forget that this

one will not make it, and no chance of success so small

personalization has the potential to result in some ugly

one will not act on it” (Adams 9). When one is using

scenarios, so both the benefits it provides to religion and

objective reasoning, one is trying to minimize risk, thus

the possible negative consequences for society should

making objective reasoning harmful to the very nature of

both be kept in mind when examining this separation of

authentic religious belief, which we have just shown to

faith from objective reasoning.

require the greatest amount of risk.
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